This paper o¤ers a monetary theory of asset liquidity-one that emphasizes the role of assets in payment arrangements-and it explores the implications of the theory for the relationship between assets' intrinsic characteristics and liquidity, and the e¤ects of policy on asset prices and welfare. The environment is a random-matching economy where risk-free bonds coexist with a risky asset, equity, and no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The liquidity di¤erential between bonds and equity results from an informational asymmetry in regard to the fundamental value of equity. The model predicts that the risk-free asset is a strictly preferred means of payment, while equity is partially illiquid. As a consequence, the risk-free rate is below its fundamental value, and the equity premium is positive, provided that the supply of bonds is not too large. This result holds irrespective of the supply of equity and despite agents being risk-neutral. Moreover, the equity premium tends to increase as equity becomes riskier. Finally, an increase in the supply of bonds has a permanent liquidity e¤ect. It raises the risk-free rate, output, and welfare, and it reduces the equity premium.
Introduction
Liquidity considerations matter for macroeconomics. They help understand asset pricing anomalies, how asset prices are co-determined with macroeconomic conditions, and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 1 Since liquidity can take di¤erent meanings, I will de…ne an asset as illiquid if it can be sold at short notice only for a discounted price, or not at all. 2 Liquid assets have an essential role in economies where credit arrangements are not always feasible to allow households and …rms to …nance spending shocks (e.g.,
consumption or investment opportunities). A critical observation from Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and
Lagos (2006) is that not all assets are equally suitable to help agents face these shocks: some assets are more liquid than others. In Kiyotaki and Moore, agents who hold land and capital can only use a fraction of their capital stock to …nance investment opportunities. In Lagos, agents hold risk-free bonds and equity, but equity shares can only be used to …nance a fraction of their consumption opportunities. While these liquidity di¤erences among assets are key for several macroeconomic phenomena, they are left unexplained by the proposed theories. In particular, no link is made between the characteristics of an asset, such as its degree of risk, the supply of the asset, and the ease with which it is traded.
The aim of this paper is to provide a monetary theory of asset liquidity-one that emphasizes the role of assets in payment arrangements-and to explore the implications of the theory for the relationship between assets' intrinsic characteristics and liquidity, and the e¤ects of policy on asset prices and welfare.
Following the literature pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , this paper considers economies where trading opportunities between randomly-matched, anonymous agents makes the use of some assets as means of payment essential. I consider an economy where two assets can serve this role, risk-free bonds and risky equity. (I also consider …at money in a later part of the paper.) Without additional frictions, all forms of wealth are equally good as means of payment, and agents are indi¤erent between which asset to spend or to accept. In order to overcome this indeterminacy, I assume that the liquidity di¤erential between bonds and equity stems from an informational asymmetry in regard to the fundamental value of the equity. Speci…cally, agents paying with an asset are better informed about its future performance than agents who receive it, which makes it costly to trade.
A key insight of the theory is that the risk-free asset is a strictly preferred means of payment, and equity is partially illiquid. In order to …nance their consumption opportunities, individuals deplete their bond holdings …rst, and they use equity as a last resort. Moreover, individuals retain a fraction of their equity holdings even when their consumption is ine¢ ciently low. A major insight of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) was to show that the acceptability of a good depends on its storage cost as well as other fundamentals (e.g., the pattern of specialization) and beliefs. In the same vein, the liquidity of the equity, as apprehended by the quantity of equity agents can sell before experiencing a deterioration of the terms of trade, depends on its dividend process. Equity becomes more illiquid as the dispersion of the dividends across states increases.
In the limiting case where the equity has no value in some states, then it becomes fully illiquid and, in the absence of risk-free assets, trades shut down. Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Lagos (2006) showed that liquidity di¤erences among assets can explain seemingly anomalistic asset prices. Similarly, my model predicts that the risk-free rate is below agents' discount rate provided that the supply of bonds is not too large, even if equity is abundant. Moreover, the liquidity di¤erential between bonds and equity generates an equity premium irrespective of the economywide stock of equity, and despite agents being risk-neutral with respect to the consumption of the dividend good. The size of the equity premium depends on the riskiness of equity: it tends to increase as the equity becomes riskier. I also show that the private information friction raises the price of risk-free bonds and the price di¤erence between bonds and equity relative to their complete information counterparts.
By taking into account assets' roles in payments, the model provides a channel through which policydescribed as a change in the supply of the risk-free bonds-a¤ects asset prices, the structure of assets'returns, and output. If the quantity of bonds is below a threshold, an increase in the supply of bonds can accommodate a larger demand for liquid assets, which raises the risk-free rate, output, and welfare. Moreover, if there is a shortage of wealth in low-dividend states, then an increase in the supply of bonds increases the rate of return of equity, and it decreases the equity premium. This liquidity e¤ect of policy is permanent, and it can account for long-lasting e¤ects of a change in the level of public debt. The optimal policy is such that the demand for risk-free assets is satiated. In that case, assets'prices are driven down to their fundamental values, and equity is illiquid, i.e., its transaction velocity (in some states) is zero.
Finally, I introduce …at money along with bonds and equity. Following Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2007), I assume that equity and bonds can be counterfeited at no cost, and can only authenticated by a fraction of agents. The model predicts a negative relationship between in ‡ation and equity's expected return. If the supply of risk-free bonds is below a threshold, then an open-market operation has a permanent liquidity e¤ect on the risk-free rate, output, and welfare. Finally, the model can generate both a rateof-return di¤erential between risk-free bonds and …at money, and an equity premium in an economy with risk-neutral agents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides a review of the relevant literature. The environment is described in Section 2 and the social optimum is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the bargaining game under incomplete information. Section 5 embeds the bargaining game into a general equilibrium structure and studies the e¤ects of policy and fundamentals on asset liquidity. Finally, Section 6 introduces …at money.
Related literature
A distinctive feature of my environment is the presence of multiple assets traded in bilateral meetings under private information. Similarly, Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) study a three-period nonmonetary game with indivisible assets. The tradeability of an asset depends on the endogenous decision of uninformed agents to accept it, and more tradeable assets exhibit a lower rate of return. Velde, Weber and Wright Private information frictions are omnipresent in both the …nance and the monetary literature. Asymmetries of informations are used to endogeneize transaction costs in …nancial markets (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) , security design (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999), and capital structure choices (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984 to explain the partial illiquidity of capital. They assume that the transfer of ownership of capital is not instantaneous so that an agent can steal a fraction of his capital before the transfer is e¤ective. 6 Similarly, Tirole (1998, 2001 ) develop a corporate …nance approach to liquidity, where a moral hazard problem prevents claims on corporate assets from being written.
In accordance with the Wallace (1996) dictum, no restrictions on the use of assets as means of payment are made. Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996), Wallace (1996 Wallace ( , 2000 and Cone (2005) emphasize asset divisibility, or lack of divisibility, to explain the coexistence of money and interest-bearing assets, and the liquidity structure of asset yields. Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) and Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) study a model where divisible money and capital compete as means of payment. In contrast to my model, there is complete information about the value of the real asset. As a consequence, money is useful provided that the capital stock in the economy is small, and if money and capital coexist they have the same rate of return. 4 Aruoba and Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007) also refer to the lack of portability of capital goods to justify the assumption that capital cannot be used as means of payment in decentralized markets. Telyukova and Wright (2008, Section 4) lay down an extension of their model with "Lucas trees," in which agents pay a …xed cost if they use their real assets as means of payment. 5 Lagos (2006) studies …rst a version of the model where the use of Lucas' trees as means of payment is unrestricted. The trading restriction is introduced to allow the model to match the equity premium in the data. Shi (2004) adopts a similar assumption in a search model with …at money and nominal bonds. 6 Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) provide an alternative explanation for why capital may not be perfectly liquid: "there may be di¤erent qualities of capital, and buyers may be less informed than sellers so that there is adverse selection in the second-hand market." This is the avenue I follow in this paper. Similarly, Zhu (2008, Section 4) discusses how one could introduce capital into his overlapping-generations model with search, and he argues that to maintain the transaction role of money, "one could assume some private information about the quality of capital, similar to the private information problem on the quality of goods in Williamson and Wright (1994) ."
Environment
The environment is similar to the one in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Time is discrete, starts at t = 0, and continues forever. 7 Each period has two subperiods: a morning, where trades occur in a decentralized market (DM), followed by an afternoon, where trades take place in a competitive market (CM). There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents divided evenly into two types, called buyers and sellers, who di¤er in terms of when they produce and consume. The labels buyers and sellers indicate agents'roles in the DM. Let B denote the set of buyers, S the set of sellers, and J = B [ S. There are two perishable consumption goods, one produced in the DM, and the other in the CM.
Representative period

Bilateral matches
Private signals Endowments of the equity Competitive markets Buyers and sellers can produce and consume in the CM. In the DM, however, buyers receive an opportunity to consume, while sellers have an opportunity to produce. The lifetime expected utility of a buyer from date 0 onward is
where x t is the CM consumption of period t,`t is the CM disutility of work, y t is the DM consumption, and 2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. The utility function u(y) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, u(0) = 0, u 0 (0) = 1, u 0 (y) > 0, and u 00 (y) < 0. The production technology in the CM, f , is linear with labor as the only input, f (`t) =`t.
The lifetime expected utility of a seller from date 0 onward is
where y t is the DM production. The cost function c(y) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0, c 0 (y) > 0, c 00 (y) 0, and c(y) = u(y) for some y > 0. Let y denote the solution to u 0 (y ) = c 0 (y ).
At the beginning of the CM, each buyer is endowed with A > 0 units of a one-period-lived real asset called equity. Because of the absence of wealth e¤ects, who receives the endowment of equity is irrelevant for the allocations. Equity is divisible and uncounterfeitable. Each unit of the period-t equity yields t+1
units of CM-output delivered in the CM of t + 1, and it fully depreciates subsequently. The dividend shocks t are independent across time with h = Pr
With no loss in generality, I normalize the expected dividend, h h + ` `, to one. 8 The government supplies a constant quantity, Z, of one-period-lived, risk-free bonds. The safety of bonds is backed by the unrestricted ability of the government to tax agents in the CM. 9 Bonds are perfectly divisible, and each unit pays one unit of output in the CM. In Section 6, I also consider the case of …at currency, an in…nitely-lived, intrinsically useless object supplied by the government. Policy is described as the buying and selling of risk-free bonds by the government. The interest payments are …nanced by lump-sum taxes to buyers in the CM.
In the CM, there is a competitive market where agents can trade consumption goods, bonds, and equity shares. In the DM, each seller is matched bilaterally with a buyer drawn at random from B. The buyer makes an o¤er that the seller accepts or rejects. If the o¤er is accepted, then the trade is implemented. 10 All trades in the DM are quid pro quo. Matched agents can transfer any nonnegative quantity of DM-output 8 In Rocheteau (2008, Appendix D) I show that the model can be generalized to allow for more than two realizations for the dividend shock. Also, the case where assets are long-lived complicates signi…cantly the proof for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, but it does not a¤ect the main insights. It is nonetheless a worthwhile extension to investigate asset prices ‡uctuations in the business cycle. Finally, it would be equivalent to consider idiosyncratic dividend shocks as long as buyers cannot fully diversify the risk of their portfolios. 9 The government can force buyers to pay taxes in the CM, but it has no enforcement power in the DM, and it does not observe agents' trading histories. In a related model, Andolfatto (2007) considers the case where the government has limited coercion power-it cannot con…scate output and cannot force agents to work-and the payment of lump-sum taxes is voluntary: agents can avoid paying taxes by not participating in the CM. He shows that if agents are su¢ ciently impatient, then the optimal monetary policy is not incentive-feasible.
1 0 I chose a bargaining protocol where the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er because it has been extensively used in monetary theory, and it remains tractable under private information. Alternatively, I could have let sellers set the terms of trade. Because of the informational asymmetry, buyers in the low dividend state would be able to capture a rent proportional to the transfer of equity in the high dividend state. See Ennis (2008) for a study of this trading mechanism in a related environment. However, in my environment buyers would have no incentives to hold bonds or …at money because it would reduce the size of their surplus in the low dividend state. and any quantity of their asset holdings. Credit arrangements are not incentive-feasible since agents are anonymous and cannot commit.
An informational asymmetry about the value of equity is introduced as follows. Buyers who enter the DM in period t receive a perfectly informative signal about the dividend of the equity, t . Sellers, in contrast, only learn the realization of the dividend in the CM of the same period. 11 An advantage in terms of formalization of having equity traded in bilateral meetings in the DM, besides being a realistic feature of many asset markets, is that it prevents the price from revealing the buyers'information at no cost.
Social optimum
Consider a social planner who chooses an allocation in order to maximize the sum of the lifetime expected utilities of all agents in the economy. The planner has full command over the resources of the economy, but it has no private information about the future value of equity, i.e., it observes the realization of the dividend shock, t , at the beginning of the CM in period t.
Let M t denote the set of bilateral matches (j; j 0 ) composed of one buyer j 2 B and one seller j 0 2 S in the DM of period t. The expression for social welfare is then
The …rst integral on the right side of (3) corresponds to the consumption net of the disutility of work for all agents from t = 0 onwards. The second term is buyers'consumption net of sellers'disutility of production in bilateral matches formed in the DM. The planner is subject to the following feasibility constraints:
The feasibility constraint (4) requires agents' CM-consumption in period t to be at most equal to the aggregate production in that period, including the output generated by equity, t A. The feasibility condition 1 1 There are several ways one can interpret this informational asymmetry. One can think of a seller as consolidating the roles of a dealer of assets and a producer. In accordance with the market micro-structure literature, the dealer is uninformed about the future value of the asset (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . Alternatively, one could adopt the assumption of Plantin (2008) that agents acquire some private information about the value of an asset by holding it. This assumption is relevant for assets that are not traded publicly, such as securitized pools of loans. In my model, sellers have no strict incentives to hold the asset, even if they could learn its future dividend in the DM, while buyers have a liquidity motive to hold the asset. Alternative information structures could be considered, e.g., a fraction of buyers and a fraction of sellers are informed. Provided that buyers know whether sellers are informed or not, the model remains tractable. (5) indicates that the buyer's consumption in a bilateral match is no greater than the seller's production in that match. The planner's problem can be rewritten as a sequence of static problems, i.e.,
The planner is indi¤erent on how to allocate the CM-goods between agents. The optimal consumption and production in bilateral matches satisfy y t (j) = y t (j 0 ) = y for all (j; j 0 ) 2 M t .
Payments under private information
In this section, I consider the bargaining game between a buyer holding a portfolio composed of a b units of equity and z b bonds, and a seller with a portfolio of a s units of equity and z s bonds. The analysis of the bargaining game is simpli…ed by assuming that the buyer's and seller's portfolios are common knowledge in the match. 12 In order to de…ne the payo¤s in the bargaining game, it is useful to derive …rst some properties of the value functions in the CM. Let W b (z; a; ) denote the value function of a buyer at the end of the DM (before the CM opens) holding z units of bonds and a units of equity, when the dividend state is 2 f `; h g.
where V b (z; a; ) is the value function of the buyer at the beginning of the DM, q z is the price of bonds (expressed in CM output), q a is the price of equity, and T is the lump-sum tax (or transfer if T < 0) by the government. The expectation is taken with respect to the future dividend state 0 . According to (8) , each buyer chooses his net consumption, x `, and his portfolio, z 0 and a 0 , in order to maximize his expected lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint (9) . According to (9) , the value of the buyer's initial portfolio in terms of CM output is a + z. In order to hold a portfolio (z 0 ; a 0 ) in the next CM, the buyer must invest q z z 0 of current output in bonds and q a a 0 in equity shares. He must also pay some lump-sum taxes T , and 1 2 This assumption is made in order to avoid having to specify the agents'beliefs regarding the portfolio held by their partner in the match. It will be shown in the following that the surplus functions in the DM are weakly monotone increasing in the agent's asset holdings. Hence, if agents had the possibility to show their portfolios in a pre-stage of the bargaining game, there would be an equilibrium where they would do so truthfully.
he receives an endowment of equity worth q a A. Substitute x `= a + z q z z 0 + q a (A a 0 ) T from (9) into (8) to obtain
The buyer's value function in the CM is linear in his wealth. Moreover, a buyer's portfolio choice is independent of his initial portfolio when he entered the period. Both properties simplify greatly the model. By the same reasoning, the expected lifetime utility of a seller at the end of the DM is given by
where V s (z; a) is the value function of the seller upon entering the DM.
The bargaining game between the buyer and the seller has the structure of a signaling game. 13 A strategy for the buyer speci…es an o¤er (y; d; The buyer's payo¤ in the dividend state is
where I A (y; d; ) is an indicator function that is equal to one if (y; d; ) 2 A. If an o¤er is accepted, then the buyer enjoys his utility of consumption in the DM, u(y), but he forgoes d units of equity and units of bonds. Using the linearity of the buyer's value function, and omitting the constant terms, the buyer's payo¤ can be expressed as his surplus
Similarly, the seller's (Bernoulli) payo¤ function is a seller that the buyer holds a high-dividend asset ( = h ) conditional on the o¤er (y; d; ) being made.
For a given belief system, the set of acceptable o¤ers for a seller is
For an o¤er to be acceptable, the seller's disutility of production in the DM, c(y), must be compensated by his expected utility in the next CM, E [ ] d + . I adopt a tie-breaking rule according to which a seller agrees to any o¤er that makes him indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting a trade. 14 The problem of a buyer holding an asset of quality is then
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. An equilibrium of the bargaining game is a pro…le of strategies for the buyer and the seller, and a belief system . If (y; d; ) is an o¤er made in equilibrium, then (y; d; ) is derived from the seller's prior belief according to Bayes's rule. Since there is no discipline for out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the equilibrium concept is re…ned by using the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) . 15 Denote U there is an out-of-equilibrium o¤er (ỹ;d;~ ) 2 F and a buyer's type 2 f`; hg such that the following is true:
where f g = f`; hgnf g. According to (14) , the o¤er (ỹ;d;~ ) would make a -type buyer strictly better o¤ if it were accepted. According to (15) , the o¤er (ỹ;d;~ ) would make the -type buyer strictly worse o¤. According to (16) , the o¤er is acceptable provided that the seller believes it comes from a type. 1 4 A similar tie-breaking assumption is used in Rubinstein (1985, Assumption B-3). It is made so that the set of acceptable o¤ers is closed, and the buyer's problem has a solution. 1 5 The Intuitive Criterion is a re…nement supported by much of the signalling literature. An equilibrium that fails the Intuitive Criterion gives an outcome that is not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . See Riley Lemma 2 Any o¤ er made by a buyer in the low-dividend state is such that
Any o¤ er made by a buyer in the high-dividend state is such that
The only way an`-type buyer can achieve a higher payo¤ than the one he would get in a game with complete information is by making an o¤er with d`> 0 that a seller would attribute to an h-type buyer with positive probability, which has been ruled out by Lemma 1. Hence, buyers in the low-dividend state make their complete information o¤er (which is always acceptable, provided that d`
0, irrespective of sellers' beliefs). The solution to (17)-(19) is
y`= y ; 
According to the Intuitive Criterion, an h-type buyer can always increase his payo¤ as long as by so doing he does not give incentives to an`-type buyer to imitate him. Hence, from (20)- (23), the buyer maximizes his surplus subject to the participation constraint of the seller, where the seller has the correct belief that he faces an h-type buyer, and subject to the incentive-compatibility condition according to which an`-type buyer does not want to mimic the o¤er of an h-type buyer.
A belief system consistent with the o¤ers in Lemma 2 is such that sellers attribute all o¤ers that would raise the payo¤ of buyers in the low-dividend state relative to their complete information payo¤ to`-type buyers, and all other out-of-equilibrium o¤ers to h-type buyers. O¤ers that violate (22) also violate (18) and, since they are attributed to`-type buyers, they are rejected.
Proposition 1 (A pecking order theory of payments)
Consider a match between a buyer holding a portfolio (z b ; a b ) and a seller holding a portfolio (z s ; a s ).
There is a solution (y h ; d h ; h ) to (20)- (23).
is the unique solution to:
where y`= min y ; c
Proposition 1 o¤ers a pecking order theory of payment choices: agents with a consumption opportunity …nance it with risk-free bonds …rst, and they use their risky assets as a last resort. 16 If buyers hold enough bonds to buy y (z b c(y )), then they do not transfer any equity to the sellers. In this sense, the risk-free bond is a preferred means of payment. Even when buyers do not have enough wealth to buy the surplusmaximizing level of output, they choose not to spend all their equity. By retaining a fraction of their equity holdings, buyers signal the high future dividend of the asset, and hence they secure better terms of trade. 1.
Part 1 of Proposition 2 describes a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the distribution of dividends across states. The propensity to spend equity in the high-dividend state decreases as the distribution becomes riskier. To understand this result, notice from (22) that`-type buyers enjoy an informational rent (the di¤erence between the buyer's surplus in the low state and the buyer's surplus in the high state) equal to
As `g ets closer to h , this informational rent shrinks, and the incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed, which improves the liquidity of equity in the high-dividend state. 18 Conversely, as h `i ncreases, the informational asymmetries become more severe, which makes the incentive-compatibiliy condition more binding. In the case where the dividend in the low state approaches 0, the adverse selection problem is so severe that equity ceases to be traded. Risk-free bonds become the only means of payment.
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Proposition 3 (Payments and portfolio composition) 1 8 This result is related to the …ndings in Banerjee and Maskin (1996), according to which the good that serves as the medium of exchange is the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest. 1 9 Strictly speaking, the` type buyers can still use equity shares in payments, but because `t ends to 0 the amount of output they buy with it approaches 0. Also, a well-know property of the equilibrium selected by the Intuitive Criterion is that the outcome is independent of the distribution of types ( h ; `) , which can make the adverse selection problem look very severe when the occurrence of the low state is infrequent. In Rocheteau (2009, Appendix C) I checked the robustness of the result to the notion of undefeated equilibrium proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993). If z b 2 [c(ŷ); c(y )) wherê y is the solution to u 0 (y) = h c 0 (y), then the unique undefeated equilibrium corresponds to the one selected by the Intuitive Criterion.
If
As the buyer's bonds holdings increase, the transfer of equity (expressed in CM output) decreases. The buyer uses his additional bonds to reduce d h , thereby relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint (22) .
This dependence of h on z b will o¤er a channel through which policy a¤ects the liquidity of equity.
According to (30) , the marginal propensity of a buyer to spend his equity in the high-dividend state is less than one. Provided that `a b + z b < c(y ), an additional unit of equity increases the surplus of the buyer in the low-dividend state, and hence it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint in the high-dividend state, which allows the buyer to spend a fraction of his marginal unit of equity.
y`= y and @d h =@a b = 0. In this case, the liquidity needs in the low-dividend state are satiated and, as a result, an additional unit of equity does not a¤ect the incentive-compatibility constraint, and hence the terms of trade, in the high-dividend state.
A benchmark
In the following, I describe the economy where there is no intervention by the government to supply risk-free bonds, z s = z b = 0. This special case provides some graphical intuition for the results, and some insights on the role of risk-free assets.
As shown in Lemma 1, there is no equilibrium of the bargaining game with a pooling o¤er. The proof is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2 . Consider an equilibrium with a pooling o¤er ( y; d) with d > 0.
(An o¤er with d < 0 would not be acceptable since the seller would receive nothing in exchange for some output and some asset.) The surpluses of the two types of buyers at the proposed equilibrium are denoted himself, an h-type buyer reduces his DM consumption as well as his transfer of asset to the seller. Provided that the reduction in y is su¢ ciently large relative to the reduction in d, an`-type buyer would not choose such an o¤er because his asset is less valuable than the one of an h-type buyer.
Pooling equilibrium Separating equilibrium
Offers violating the Intuitive Criterion Turn to the normative properties of the equilibrium. If `a b c(y ), then the value of the low-dividend asset is large enough to trade the …rst-best quantity, y . Under complete information, the economy would achieve its …rst best. In contrast, if the quality of the asset is private information, then the equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient. The`-type buyers consume y , but h-type buyers consume y h < y . If `a b < c(y ), then the quantities traded in the DM are ine¢ ciently low in all matches, i.e., y h < y`< y . 20 The ine¢ ciency induced by the private information problem can be shown in a rather dramatic way by looking at the case where `a pproaches 0, i.e., equity is valueless in one state. Then, from Proposition 2, h goes to 0 so that buyers do not spend any of their real asset holdings, and the market shuts down ( y h ; y`! 0).
As revealed by Proposition 1, by holding risk-free assets the buyer can overcome the ine¢ ciency associated with the private information problem. In particular, if z b c(y ), then the …rst-best allocation is obtained, and buyers do not use the real asset as means of payment in the high-dividend state.
Asset prices and liquidity
This section incorporates the bargaining game studied in Section 4 into the general equilibrium structure described in Section 2, and it investigates the implications of the model for the relationship between policy, assets'liquidity and returns. The objective is twofold. First, I will show qualitatively the potential of the model to account for standard asset pricing puzzles, such as the risk-free rate and equity premium puzzles. I will establish conditions under which the risk-free rate is lower than the discount rate and the equity premium is positive despite quasi-linear preferences. Second, I will show that a policy that consists in changing the supply of risk-free bonds has a permanent liquidity e¤ect on the structure of assets' returns, output, and The missing block of the model is the determination of agents'portfolio choices. These choices depend 2 0 One could also ask whether there exists an incentive-feasible trading mechanism that implements the …rst-best allocation in the absence of risk-free bonds. Consider a direct mechanism that maps the buyer's type into an o¤er (y; d). Thus, the …rst-best is incentive-feasible provided that a b c(y ) and h u(y )=c(y ), i.e., there is no shortage of the asset, and the discrepancy between the dividends in the di¤erent states is not too large. 2 1 The solutions to (17)- (19) and (20)- (23) might not be unique, e.g., if z b > c(y ), but agents' surpluses are unique, and they are independent of the seller's asset holdings.
on the bene…ts that an agent expects from holding assets in the DM. The expected lifetime utility of a buyer entering the DM with z units of bonds, a units of equity, and a private signal , is
Using the linearity of W b , (31) becomes
where S (z; a) is the buyer's surplus in the DM when the dividend state is , i.e., S (z; a) u [y(z; a; )] d(z; a; ) (z; a; ) for 2 f`; hg:
Substituting V b by its expression given by (32) into (10), the buyer's portfolio problem reduces to 
Substituting V s from (34) into (11), the seller's choice of asset holdings is given by
Finally, the clearing of the asset market implies
De…nition 2 An equilibrium is a list of portfolios, terms of trade in the DM, the prices of equity and bonds, (iii) (q a ; q z ) solves (36) and (37) .
The next two lemmas characterize the buyers'and sellers'portfolio choices.
Lemma 3 (Sellers' portfolio choices)
Consider the seller's portfolio problem in (35) . It has a solution if and only if q z and q a .
The proof, which is immediate from (35), is omitted. Sellers, who get no surpluses from the trades in the DM, hold an asset only if its price is equal to its fundamental value. Let S z and S a denote the partial derivatives of the buyer's surplus function for 2 f`; hg. These quantities represent the transactional bene…ts to a buyer that bonds and equity provide at the margin in the DM in the dividend state .
Lemma 4 (Buyers' portfolio choices)
If q z and q a , then (z; a) is a solution to the buyer's portfolio problem, (33) , if and only if
where
If q z > and q a > , then (z; a) is unique.
If q z = , then z c(y ).
If q a = , then z + `a c(y ).
From (38) and (39) , for an asset to be held by buyers, its cost must be equal to the expected marginal bene…t that the asset confers to the buyers in the DM. According to (40) , a marginal unit of asset allows the buyer to purchase 1=c 0 (y`) units of DM output when the dividend state is low; this additional output is valued according to the marginal surplus of the match, u 0 (y`) c 0 (y`). The …rst term in brackets on the right side of (41) is the liquidity value of bonds in the high-dividend state, in the complete information economy.
This term is multiplied by 1 +
< 1 because, in the private information economy, the buyer with an additional unit of bond reduces his transfer of equity in order to mitigate the informational asymmetry in the match. Similarly, the …rst two terms on the right side of (42) correspond to the liquidity value of equity in the high-dividend state in the complete information economy. This liquidity component is multiplied by the marginal propensity to spend the equity,
, which is less than one in the private information economy.
If the asset prices are greater than their fundamental values, i.e., q a > and q z > , then the buyer's optimal portfolio is unique. This result is a consequence of Proposition 1 according to which bonds and equity are imperfect substitutes. Since the two assets do not perform the same role-risk-free bonds are preferred means of payment-there is an optimal composition of the buyer's portfolio. If equity is priced according to its fundamental value, q a = , then the buyer's choice of equity is indeterminate: buyers accumulate enough wealth to buy the …rst-best quantity of output when = `. If the rate of return of bonds is equal to the discount rate, i.e., q z = , then buyers accumulate enough bonds to buy the …rst-best level of output in all states.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium allocations and prices)
An equilibrium exists, and it is such that (q a ; q z ; y`; y h ) is uniquely determined. Asset prices are
with
where y`= min y ; c 1 (Z + `A ) and y h solves (28) with z = Z.
An equilibrium exists, and it is essentially unique. 22 The asset prices, q z and q a , are determined from (38) and (39) at equality, where a = A and z = Z. The price of each asset is composed of its fundamental value, , times a liquidity factor. The liquidity factors, L z and L a , coincide with their expressions in the complete information economy, except for the last terms in brackets on the right sides of (45) and (46) . 23 The term
@z b captures the fact that when the buyer accumulates additional units of the risk-free asset, he reduces the quantity of equity he transfers to the seller @d h @z b < 0 . Similarly, the private information friction reduces the liquidity value of equity, The risk-free rate is below the rate of time preference if the quantity of risk-free assets in the economy is not large enough to allow buyers to consume the …rst-best level of output in the DM. In this case bonds have a positive liquidity value irrespective of the economy-wide stock of equity. 24 Bonds are useful, even
for large values of A, because they overcome the partial illiquidity of the equity in the high-dividend state,
i.e., they relax the incentive-compatibility constraint faced by buyers, which allows them to consume more.
Equity shares can also be valued for their liquidity services if the economy-wide wealth in the low dividend state is too scarce to allow the implementation of the …rst-best allocation, Z + `A < c(y ). 25 The liquidity value of bonds, however, is greater than the liquidity value of equity. As a consequence, the rate-of-return di¤erential between bonds and equity, the equity premium, is positive. 2 2 Any indeterminacy, such as the composition of the payments in terms of equity and bonds in the low dividend state when Z + `A > c(y ), is payo¤ irrelevant. 2 3 See Appendix D in Rocheteau (2009a) for a derivation of the asset prices in the complete information economy. 2 4 Huggett (1993) provides a related explanation for the low risk-free interest rate. He considers an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and partially insure themselves by holding a risk-free asset. 2 5 Weill (2008) also relates the liquidity of an asset to is supply. In his model, due to search frictions and increasing returns in the matching process, an asset with more tradeable shares is easier to …nd.
Since agents are risk-neutral with respect to the CM consumption, the equity premium does not emerge from the standard risk-aversion component of the pricing kernel. Risk matters here for two reasons. First, the riskiness of equity generates a covariance between its dividend and the marginal value of wealth in the DM. This covariance is negative in the complete information economy because a high dividend is associated with a high wealth. This reduces the liquidity value of equity relative to bonds. 26 In contrast, in the private information economy the DM output is lower in the high-dividend state relative to the low-dividend state.
(See Proposition 1.) Second, the riskiness of equity makes the informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers relevant. It is because the dividend of equity can take di¤erent values, and because buyers have some private information about the future value of the asset, that risk-free bonds are preferred means of payment. How do asset prices compare in the private-information and the complete-information economies? Asset prices in the complete information economy are
with y cì = min y ; c
Proposition 6 (Private information and asset prices)
If Z < c(y ), then the price of bonds is greater, and the risk-free rate lower, than their counterparts in the complete information economy. Moreover, the price di¤erence between bonds and equity is larger
Private information economy
Complete information economy *) (y c that the model generates a risk-free rate which is too high and an equity premium which is too low (for plausible degrees of risk aversion). Under a mild restriction on the use of equity to …nance consumption opportunities-in 2 percent of the DM trades buyers cannot use equity-the sizes of the risk-free rate and equity premium can be made comparable to the ones in data. Proposition 6 suggests that such restrictions might not be needed in economies where informational asymmetries are prevalent.
The next Proposition investigates how the discrepancy between the dividend in di¤erent states a¤ects the structure of asset returns.
Proposition 7 (Safety and rates of return)
1. If `= h = 1, then r a = r z for all Z 0.
If
If equity is safe, then bonds and equity have the same rate of return. At the opposite, if equity is so risky that it is valueless in the low state, then the turnover of the equity in the high-dividend state goes to 0, and its rate of return approaches its maximum given by the discount rate.
I now turn to the e¤ects of policy on assets'returns. Policy is described as the change in the supply of risk-free bonds.
Proposition 8 (Policy and asset prices)
1. If Z < Z , then dL z =dZ < 0 and dr z =dZ > 0.
2. If Z < Z, then dL a =dZ < 0 and dr a =dZ > 0. 4. For all Z Z , y`= y h = y and r z = r a = 1 .
If the risk-free rate is below the rate of time preference, then an increase in the supply of bonds raises the risk-free rate. The output in the DM, and hence social welfare, increase as well. 27 The liquidity e¤ect associated with a change in the supply of bonds is permanent, and it prevails for any quantity of equity in the economy. Policy also a¤ects the rate of return of equity and the equity premium if there is a shortage of wealth in the low state. An increase in the supply of bonds raises the return of equity, and it reduces the rate-of-return di¤erential between assets.
The "Ricardian equivalence" fails to hold because there is a social role for the provision of risk-free assets. 28 The optimal policy consists in supplying enough bonds so as to satiate the demand for safe assets.
As Z tends to Z , then y`and y h approach y . In the high-dividend state, buyers trade with bonds only (d h ! 0), while in the low-dividend state buyers are indi¤erent between using bonds or equity to …nance their consumption opportunities. The prices of bonds and equity converge to their fundamental values (q a = and q z = ).
Introducing …at money
In Rocheteau (2008 Rocheteau ( , 2009a , I show that …at money can perform the same safety role as government bonds.
Consider the case where bonds are replaced by …at money, and the supply of money grows at the constant rate > . At a stationary monetary equilibrium, the rate of return of …at money is
denote the cost of holding real balances.
Proposition 9 (Equilibrium with …at money)
1. For all A > 0, there is a i 0 (A) > 0 such that the equilibrium is monetary if and only if i < i 0 (A).
If i < i
4. If i < i 0 (A) and A < A(i), then dL a =di > 0 and dr a =di < 0.
This proposition is proved in Rocheteau (2009a) . A monetary equilibrium exists for all A provided that the cost of holding money, i, is not too large. The expected rate of return of equity is then larger than the rate of return of currency. Moreover, the price of equity exhibits a liquidity component if its stock is not too large, and in ‡ation is in some intermediate range. By reducing the rate of return of …at money, an increase in is analogous to a reduction in the quantity of risk-free assets. Hence, an increase in in ‡ation raises the price of equity, and it reduces its rate of return. The optimal monetary policy is to the Friedman rule, which requires ! . As the rate of return of currency tends to the discount rate, the quantity of real balances approaches Z and the output levels in the DM approach their …rst best.
In the rest of the section, I propose an extension of the model with both …at money and interest-bearing bonds. Without additional frictions, bonds and …at money are perfect substitutes, and they must o¤er the same rate of return. Fiat money is valued if Z < Z and i < L z , where L z is evaluated at the non-monetary equilibrium. In order to distinguish bonds from …at money, I follow Freeman (1985) and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2007) and assume that all assets except …at money can be counterfeited at no cost. Moreover, only a fraction of the sellers are able to authenticate bonds and equity shares. The remaining 1 sellers cannot distinguish genuine bonds and equity shares from counterfeits, and hence they only accept …at money in payment for goods. 29 2 9 Arguably, the assumption that all assets except …at money can be counterfeited at no cost is extreme. In Rocheteau (2009b) I extend Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2007) by assuming that claims on real assets can be counterfeited at a positive cost, and I show that in uninformed matches there is an endogenous upper bound on how much of their real asset holdings buyer can use as means of payment. When the cost to produce counterfeits goes to zero, so does the upper bound on agents'capacity to spend their real assets.
Letŷ denote the output level in the 1 uninformed matches where sellers only accept …at money. If m denotes the real balances of a buyer in a match, thenŷ(m) = min y ; c 1 (m) and the buyer's surplus is
. The buyer's portfolio problem becomes
Real balances a¤ect both the buyer's surplus in uninformed matches and the buyer's expected surplus in informed matches. From the …rst-order condition with respect to m, the value of money solves
According to (49) , the cost of holding …at money must equal the sum of its liquidity returns in informed and uninformed matches. The liquidity value of money in uninformed matches corresponds to the increase in the buyer's surplus in the DM from buying 1 c 0 (ŷ) unit of output with an additional unit of real balances. Similarly, the rates of return of bonds and equity are determined by
In contrast to …at money, bonds and equity provide some liquidity services only in the fraction of the matches where they can be authenticated. Let M = R m(j)dj denote the aggregate real balances. An equilibrium can be reduced to a triple (M; q z ; q a ) that solves (49)- (52).
Proposition 10 (Monetary equilibrium)
For all < 1 and > , there is a unique monetary equilibrium. There is Z < Z such that for all
There always exists a monetary equilibrium. Provided that the supply of bonds is not too large, the model predicts both a rate-of-return di¤erential between currency and bonds and an equity premium. The next Proposition revisits the e¤ects of policy in this environment. While a change in the nominal stock of money is neutral, a change in the supply of bonds can have real e¤ects.
Proposition 11 (Policy)
If Z < Z , then a reduction of Z leads to a reduction of r z , a reduction of M + Z, and an increase of M .
Suppose that monetary policy takes the form of a change in the quantity of money accompanied by an opposite change in the supply of bonds. Provided that Z is not too large, this open-market operation has a permanent liquidity e¤ect that a¤ects real interest rates, output, and welfare. A reduction of the stock of bonds leads to an increase in real balances and a decrease of the rate of return of bonds. Hence, prices increase but not in the same proportions as the increase in the quantity of money. The increase in real balances leads to an increase of the output in informed matches,ŷ. However, the real stock of money and bonds, M + Z, decreases, which generates a reduction of the output in uninformed matches, y`and y h .
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide a monetary theory of asset liquidity that emphasizes the role of assets in payment arrangements. The main ingredients of the model are the presence of multiple assets, risk-free bonds and risky equity, that are traded in both centralized and decentralized markets, and an informational asymmetry between agents paying with an asset, and agents receiving the asset. I have explored the implications of the theory for the relationship between assets' intrinsic characteristics and liquidity, and the e¤ects of policy on asset prices and welfare. To conclude, I review the empirical relevance of some of the predictions of the model.
A key …nding of this paper is that the liquidity of an asset depends on the properties of its dividend
process. An asset which is riskier tends to be less liquid. There are several studies in support of this …nding. The model has asset pricing implications that are consistent with the risk-free rate and equity premium puzzles. It predicts that the rate of return of government bonds is less than the rate of time preference, and risky equity commands a higher return than risk-free bonds despite agents' being risk-neutral. While our results are qualitative, Lagos (2006) showed that a monetary model with a more standard pricing kernel and exogenous liquidity constraints could generate the observed risk-free rate and equity premium for plausible measures of risk aversion. Once …at money is introduced, the model can generate both a rate of return di¤erence between money and bonds, and an equity premium.
The model also predicts a negative relationship between the liquidity di¤erential between risk-free bonds and risky assets and the supply of risk-free bonds. This is consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen ( 
A necessary condition for ( y; d; ) to be acceptable when
Then, O 1 is open in F, and it contains ( y; d; ). Let 
In order to show that O 2 6 = ?, one can construct an o¤er (y; d; ) 2 F such that y = y, d d < 0, < 0, (18) is violated, i.e.,
But an o¤er is acceptable if
From (53) and (54) 
So the h-type buyer could obtain more than the total surplus of the match, which would violate the incentive-compatibility condition in any separating equilibrium. 
The set of acceptable and feasible o¤ers is compact, and it is nonempty provided that " < U b . From the Theorem of the Maximum, U " is continuous in ", and lim "!0 U " = U . Hence, there is an " > 0 such
h . The associated o¤er satis…es (14)- (16) > U b , then`-type buyers can achieve a payo¤ strictly greater than their complete information payo¤, which contradicts (i).
Finally, the solution to (20)- (23) is incentive-compatible since (y`; d`; `) with d` 0 satis…es (21) and (22).
(iii) Beliefs.
A belief system consistent with the o¤ers in Lemma 2 is such that (y h ; d h ; h ) = 1 and (y`; d`; `) = 0 if 
and d h 0. The incentive-compatibility condition (22) implies
which is satis…ed. This solution is consistent with Parts 1 and 2 of the Proposition. In the following, I focus on the case where a b > 0.
Part 1 of the Proposition. I investigate in turn the conditions under which the constraints (21) and (22) are slack. First, suppose that the incentive-compatibility condition (22) is slack. Then, y h = min y ; c
u(y`) c(y`): (22) Second, suppose that the seller's participation constraint (21) is slack. Substitute u(y h ) by its expression given by (22) at equality into the objective function (20) to get
, which requires y`< y and y h > y`.
From (18) and (21), Since (21) is binding and h = z b , d h is given by (27) . Substitute d h by its expression into (22) at equality to get (28) . For all y h 2 [0; y`] the left side of (28) solution to (28) . The objective in (20) 
for any solution to (28) . Hence, the unique solution in (0; y`) delivers a maximum to the problem (20)- (23) .
Given a unique y h , d h is determined by (27) . Finally, c(y
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) From Proposition 1, if z b < c(y ), then y h is the unique solution in [0; y`] to (28) . Di¤erentiate (28) to obtain
where y`= min y ; c 1 ( `a b + z b ) and d h > 0 (from Proposition 1 and the assumption a b > 0). From (27) ,
0 (y h ) < 0:
(ii) From (28), as `a pproaches to 0 y h tends to the solution to
where I have used that y`= c 1 (z b ) when z b < c(y ). Consequently, y h ! y`and, from (27) ,
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 1, if z b < c(y ), then y h is the unique solution in [0; y`] to (28) . Di¤erentiating (28) ,
From (27) ,
1, and hence (29) . The assumption a b > 0 implies y`> y h (Proposition 1) and (30) is obtained by a similar reasoning.
Proof of Lemma 4. I show that the objective function in (33) is jointly concave in (z; a). First, compute the …rst and second partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives of the surplus functions S`(z; a) and S h (z; a). From Lemma 2, S`(z; a) =Ŝ`(z + `a ) witĥ
, and Sà a = ( `) 2Ŝ 00 . From Proposition 1, if z < c(y ), then y h solves (28), i.e.,
Totally di¤erentiating the equation above,
Notice that dy h dz > 0 for all z < c(y ), and dy h da > 0 for all (z; a) such that z + `a < c(y ). From Proposition 1, the seller's participation constraint (21) holds at equality so that S h (z; a) = u(y h ) c(y h ). Hence,
For all y 2 [0; y ], (y) 2 [0; 1] and, since u 0 (y)=c 0 (y) is decreasing in y, 0 (y) < 0. Furthermore,
For all z < c(y ), S h zz < 0. Consequently, the …rst leading principal minor of the Hessian matrix associated with (33) , h S h zz + `Szz , is nonpositive, and it is strictly negative for all z < c(y ).
The determinant of the Hessian matrix associated with (33) is
It can be decomposed as jHj = 1 + 2 + 3 where
Since S`(z; a) =Ŝ`(z + `a ), 1 = 0. After some calculation,
where and 0 are evaluated at y = y h . Therefore,
Hence, jHj 0, with a strict inequality for all z + `a < c(y ). Hence, the …rst-order conditions (38) and (39) are necessary and su¢ cient for an optimum to the buyer's problem.
In the following, I review the di¤erent cases depending on whether asset prices are equal, greater, or smaller than their fundamental values ( ).
(i) q z > and q a > .
I now show that there is a unique solution to (33) . First, the solution to (33) is such that z + `a c(y ).
Suppose z + `a > c(y ). Then,Ŝ 0 = 0 and S So one can restrict (z; a) to the compact set f(z; a) 2 R 2+ : z + `a c(y )g and, from the Theorem of the Maximum, a solution to (33) exists, and it satis…es the …rst-order conditions (38)- (39) . Since H is negative de…nite for all (z; a) such that z + `a < c(y ), i.e., the leading principal minors of H alternate in sign with the …rst one being negative, the solution to (33) is unique.
(ii) q z > and q a = .
From the …rst-order condition for a, (39), S h a (z; a) = Sà(z; a) = 0, which requires z + `a c(y ). The …rst-order condition for z, (38) , implies (iv) q z = q a = .
From (38) , S h z (z; a) = Sz(z; a) = 0, which implies z c(y ). From (39), a 2 [0; +1).
(v) q z < or q a < .
Since S h a (z; a) 0 and Sà(z; a) 0 there is no solution to the …rst-order condition for a, (39).
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two parts. First, I show that the asset prices are uniquely determined. Then, I prove that the output levels in the DM are also uniquely characterized.
(i) Asset prices
Consider the portfolio correspondance P (q z ; q a ) de…ned as 1 where z b is the unique solution to (38) . If q z = and q a = , then P (q z ; q a ) = [c(y ); 1) [0; 1). In all cases, the aggregate portfolio correspondance P coincides with the buyer's portfolio correspondance. Since the buyer's objective function in (33) is jointly concave in (z; a), then P is convex-valued. Consequently, (A; Z) 2 P (q z ; q a ) if and only if (A; Z) is solution to (33), i.e., (38) and (39) hold at equality with a = A and z = Z.
From (38) ,
Consequently, there is a unique q z that solves (61), and it is such that qz 1. This expression for q z coincides with (43) where the term in brackets is L z given by (45) . From (39),
Hence, q a is uniquely determined, and it is such that qa 1. This expression for q a coincides with (44) where the term in brackets is L a given by (46) .
(ii) DM allocations. (iii) From (45) and (46),
Moreover, the inequality is strict unless L a = L z = 0. Hence, from (i) and (ii), L a < L z if and only if Z < Z . From (38) - (39),
Hence, r a r z . Moreover, the inequality is strict unless r a = r z = 1 . Hence, from (i) and (ii), r a > r z if and only if Z < Z .
Proof of Proposition 6. I …rst establish that q z > q From (43) and (44), 
If < 1, then the right side of (64) is decreasing in M : it tends to in…nity as M approaches 0, and it is equal to 0 for all M c(y ). Hence, for all i > 0, there is a M 2 (0; c(y )) solution to the equation above.
Given M , q z and q a are determined by (51) and (52) .
From (45) and (51) 
